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ABSTRACT: 
We assess the IMF supported program on the structural reforms after the Asian crisis in 1997 in 
terms of the before-after, with-without and event study approaches with applying a time varying 
parameter model to the nine Asian stock markets. All the supported countries except for Thailand 
( Indonesia, Korea and Philippine) remarkably improve market efficiency after the 
implementation of the program, implying positive assessment of the program in the before-after 
approach. Among the non-supported countries, China, Taiwan, and Malaysia do not improve 
efficiency after the breakout of the crisis, providing partially positive assessment in the 
with-without approach. The Thailand, Indonesia and Korean markets show the positive abnormal 
returns at the dates or at the next dates of program’s announcement, providing partially positive 
assessment of announcement effects in the event study approach. 
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1. Introduction 
 The IMF program to settle the difficulties caused by the Asian crisis consists of a 
macroeconomic policy (combining exchange rate, monetary and fiscal policy) and a structural 
reform policy including corporate governance. The objectives of the first policy in the IMF 
supported program are to restore the stabilization of exchange rates and financial markets, and to 
recover the real economy. The second policy in this program aims to lower the possibility of 
future crises (i.e., a long-run policy). The Annual Reports of IMF (1998, ch.5 and 1999, ch.4) 
describe the program in detail. 
 Several papers assessed the first policy in the IMF program. Ito (1999) and Yoo and Moon 
(1999) assessed no smooth recovery in the real economy and claimed that the IMF programs that 
do not address the crux of the matter were ineffective and costly. Berg (1999) stated that the issues 
of short-run stabilization receded as early as 1999. However, Cerra and Sweta (2005) found that 
while growth recovered fairly quickly after the crisis, there was evidence of permanent losses in 
the levels of output in all the countries. Lane et al. (1999) presented a preliminary assessment that 
the developments toward recovery had been much more favorable in Thailand and Korea that had 
been able to keep to the programs, but Indonesia had been still facing more difficult task in part 
because of the severity of the underlying political crisis. Kho and Stulz (2000) found the negative 
impact of IMF bailout announcements on the bank stock indices. In contrast, Lau and McInish 
(2003) found the positive impact on the individual bank stock returns and on the multiple event 
dates.  
 To our knowledge, there are no papers for assessing the second policy. Since the second 
policy aims at long-run effect, its effect does not appear in a short-run.1 However, it is interesting 
to assess the second policy because success of this policy contributes to prevent another 
Asian-type crisis. This policy is a structural reform policy including corporate governance. The 
chronological highlights of IMF program on structural reforms for the supported countries of 
Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea are presented at Table 1. The second policy focusing on the 
closure of unviable financial institutions is not considered in this paper because the closure is not 
                                                     
1 Lane et al.(1999) presented a preliminary assessment that in Korea and Indonesia, deficiencies in 
corporate governance were recognized at the outset but the progress had been very slow. The reform 
agenda for the financial and corporate sectors is still evolving and it is too early to asses in detail the 
multitude of measures that were planned and implemented. However, they pointed out a number of 
important general questions regarding program design from the experience with the first program.    
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a long-run but short-run policy.2 The programs for each country were modified several times in 
the light of climate in its economy. However, the common strand in the policies is to improve 
governance in both the corporate and government sectors, to enhance economic efficiency and 
transparency, and then to attract foreign capital through upgrading accounting, auditing and 
disclosure standards. In actuality, the four supported countries (Thailand, Indonesia, Korea and 
Philippines) implemented the measures along the supported programs. When the policies become 
effective in a long-run, the investor's accessibility to the markets increases, the information 
surrounding the markets prevails instantaneously among the investors, and then the current price 
should reflect all available information. That is, the success of the second policy in the IMF 
program means that the assumptions of the efficient market hypothesis are satisfied and then the 
markets become efficient.3 
 The purpose of this paper is to assess the second policy of the IMF program by the way of 
examining whether the program contributes to the improvement of market efficiency in the 
supported countries after the crisis.  
 First, we employ the two methodologies for assessing the programs which are the two out 
of four classified by Khan (1990). The methods of evaluating the fund-supported programs are 
classified into the four distinct categories by Khan (1990): (1) the before-after approach, which 
compares the performance of a country during the program and that of this country prior to the 
program; (2) the with-without approach, which compares the performance of a country with the 
program and that of other countries without the program; (3) the actual-versus-target approach, 
which compares the actual performance under the program and that specified by the target of the 
program; (4) the comparison-of-simulations approach, which compares the simulated 
performance of fund program-type policies and the performance of other policies. He argues the 
advantage and disadvantage about each approach. But it is difficult to single out the best approach. 
Nevertheless, as Khan (1990) pointed out, approach (1) and (2) are relatively popular based on 
restricted information for the program, compared with the other approaches. We apply the 
before-after and with-without approaches for assessing the IMF program which supported 
Thailand, Indonesia, Korea and Philippines after the break out of the Asian financial crisis. The 
                                                     
2 The last modification of the supported program for Korea was done on May 2 1998, which is not closely 
related to structural reform and then deleted from Table 1.   
3 See Fama (1970) and Jensen (1978) for the definition of efficiency market. 
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combined use of two approaches is expected to complement the shortcoming of each method.4  
The time varying parameter model was introduced to investigate the dynamic efficiency in the 
East- European emerging markets by Rockinger and Urga (2000, 2001). Their model can enhance 
the gradual change of market efficiency. We use the time varying parameter model of Tsukuda, 
Miyakoshi and Shimada (2006) which extends their model to more appropriate one for describing 
the dynamic behaviors of stock returns and includes their model as a special case. 
 Second, we employ a recent new methodology for assessing the program’s announcement 
effects which is not picked up by Khan (1990). The event study approach is applied to assess the 
program’s announcement by Kho and Stulz (2000) and Lau and McInish (2003), which 
investigate whether the IMF bailout announcements on the bank stock indices make a positive 
abnormal return. The positive abnormal returns are evidences that the program’s announcements 
help ameliorate systemic risk in the bailout countries. 
 We analyze the nine Asian stock markets in which Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea had the 
support from the IMF program after the breakout of the crisis on July 2 1997, Philippine took the 
program before the crisis, while Hong Kong, Singapore, China, Taiwan and Malaysia did not take 
the program. All the IMF-supported countries except for Thailand remarkably improve efficiency 
in the stock markets after the implementation of the program. In terms of the before-after 
approach, the IMF program is successful. In terms of the with-without approach, the IMF program 
is effective if we choose China, Taiwan and Malaysia as the without-supported countries, while 
the program does not provide the evidence for success if Hong Kong and Singapore are chosen. 
However, the improvement of market efficiency in Hong Kong and Singapore after the crisis can 
be attributed to their own structural reform programs. As a whole, the IMF program is positively 
assessed to improve market efficiency. The announcements of the IMF-supported program for 
Thailand, Indonesia and Korea have produced positive abnormal returns, ameliorating systemic 
risk. While the previous researches including Kho and Stulz (2000) and Lau and McInish (2003) 
analyzed the announcement effects of the macroeconomic policy with the short-run effects which 
results appear soon, we have investigated the announcement effects of a structural reform policy 
with the long run effects which results take long time to appear.     
                                                     
4 See Khan (1990, p.201 and 203): “The shortcoming of the before-after approach makes it a poor 
estimator of the counterfactual, because the situation prevailing before the program is not likely to be a 
good predictor of what would have happened in a absence of the program….” and “The problem is that 
program countries differ systematically from non-program countries prior to the program period, and this 
difference matters for performance evaluation”. 
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  This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we sketch a time varying parameter model 
of Tsukuda, Miyakoshi and Shimada (2006) and explain the testing hypothesis for market 
efficiency by employing the before-after approach and the with-without approach classified by 
Khan (1990). In Section 3, we describe the data set and provide some preliminary analyses based 
on the summary statistics. In Section 4, we estimate the market efficiency and discuss the 
assessment of IMF supported program. In Section 5 we employ an event study approach. Section 
6 concludes. 
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
 
2. Before-After Approach and With-Without Approach 
 The paper employs the before-after approach and the with-without approach classified by 
Khan (1990) for assessing the IMF supported programs to tackle the problems caused by the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997. The program did not start at the same date for all countries. In fact 
the program started at the different dates from country to country and was modified several times. 
But we suppose that the program for each country started on July 2, 1997 when the Asian crisis 
broke out. We compare the market efficiency during the program (i.e., after the crisis) with that 
prior to the program (i.e., before the crisis) for the before-after approach, and compare the market 
efficiency between the countries with program (Thailand, Indonesia, Korea and Philippine) and 
those without program (Hong Kong, Singapore, China, Taiwan and Malaysia) for the with-without 
approach. 
 We use a time-varying coefficient model of Tsukuda, Miyakoshi and Shimada (2006).5 Let 
the return on the stock price index (Pt) at time t be rt = 100{ log Pt - log Pt-1}. The return 
generating process follows a first order autoregressive (AR(1)) process: 
 
the observation equation: 
,rbbr t1-tt1,t0,t ε++=  ( )2t1-tt 0,N~I σε , t = 1, …, T;   (1) 
                                                     
5 This type specification was first proposed by Rockinger and Urga (2000) to analyze the market 
efficiency in the East European emerging economies. The coefficient β is not restricted to one in our model 
opposed to β = 1 in their model. Our model nests their model. See Tsukuda, Miyakoshi and Shimada 
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where It-1 is the information set available up to time t-1. The unobservable time varying 
parameters are assumed to follow the AR(1) process 
 
the state equation: 
ti,2 i,1 i,1ti,iiti,  ** t* tb b ηγγβα ++++= − ,  ηi, t ~ NID( 0, q2i )  for i=0,1; (2) 
 
where γ0, 1= γ0, 2= 0,6 t* and t** are the dummy variables such that t* = 10-3t for t < t1 (t1 denotes 
the date when the Asian financial crisis broke out, i.e. July 2, 1997) and t* = 10-3t1 for t1 ≤ t, and 
t** = 0 for t < t1 and t** = 10-3 (t- t1) for t1 ≤ t. We have employed 10-3 for the scale adjustment, 
since the number of the sample is about 2000. Figure 1 is a schematic diagram that describes this 
idea. All random noises in the observation equation are assumed to be independent of ηi,t. If γ1, 2 
≠ 0 in (2), the model has a structural change at t = t1. The b0,t and b1,t in (1) are the time- varying 
parameters which measure the predictable part based on the previous returns (i.e., previous 
information).  
 
[Figure 1] 
 
 For the noises of the observation equation (1), we assume EGARCH(1,1) model,  
 
 ( )t1-t3t1-t22 1t1t02    ln  D ln σεφσεφσφδφσ ++++= −t  (3) 
 
where Dt is the dummy variable such that Dt = 0 for t < t1 and Dt = 1 for t1 ≤ t. The dummy 
variable Dt changes the level of log volatility  
 The model constitutes a state space representation with an observation equation of (1) 
and state equations of (2). Since the behavior of unobservable process {bi, t} is a main interest of 
                                                                                                                                                                            
(2006) for more explanation of the differences between the two models.    
6 Since this paper is interested in the dynamic efficiency of the markets, we introduce a time trend only for 
the process of {b1, t }, but do not for the process of {b0, t } 
 
 6
this paper, we briefly explain a basic idea of estimating {bi, t} by using the Kalman filter algorithm. 
It estimates {bi, t} in two ways. The filtering estimate is the expectation of bi, t conditional on the 
observations up to the period t {r1,…,rt}. The smoothing estimate which we use is the expectation 
of bi, t conditional on the whole observations {r1,…,rT}. Generally the latter is expected to be more 
reliable than the former because the latter utilizes the full information available based on the 
whole samples {r1,…,rT}. We can obtain the maximum likelihood estimates of the unknown 
parameters ) , , , ,,,,, ,b ,,, ,b( 321012,11,1110 1,0000 0, φφφφγγβαβαθ qq= , and the standard 
asymptotic theory is applicable if the error terms are normal and the state space processes are 
stationary. For initial conditions, we specify the b0,0 and b1,0 as the constant coefficients which are 
calculated by the sample first-order autoregressive model from the first 20 observations.  
    If b1,t = 0 in (1), the returns at period t is not predictable, which in turn implies the market 
efficiency in the weak form of Fama (1970). We measure the dynamic efficiency through 
examining the time trend of the smoothed estimates of b1, t. The dynamic efficiency over time 
periods may be confirmed, if 11 <β  and the non-stochastic part ( α1 +γ1,1 t*+γ 1,2 t**) with 
t*=10-3t1 goes to zero over time within the sample periods. Seeing Figure 1, we test the hypothesis 
of α1≥ 0 and /or γ1,1≥0 , α1 +γ1,1 10-3t1>0, and γ 1,2<0 and α1 +γ1,1 10-3t1+γ1,210-3 (tT-t1) ≈0. Needless 
to say, our model cannot be extrapolated to the out-of-sample periods, because the non-stochastic 
part eventually explodes to infinity. Though we have tried to incorporate the quadratic term of 
time like 1/t2, the model did not show good performances.  
 It is significant to check whether 11 <β or not. The specification of (2) includes the Random 
Walk (RW) type as a special case. If 11 =β , the AR type model reduces to the RW type one. Most 
of previous researches including Rockinger and Urga (2000, 2001) imposed the RW type 
restriction to the state equation (2) for investigating the dynamic efficiency of the markets. But 
they did not test the RW type hypothesis against the AR(1) type one based upon the data from the 
East European emerging markets. The appropriateness of the statistical models should be 
determined from the data we observe. As Groenewold and Fraser (1999) did, one way of choosing 
the model between the AR(1) type and the RW type is to test the hypothesis:  
 
H0  :  β1 = 1    v.s.  H1 :  β1  <  1.                               (4) 
 
This constitutes a unit root test applied for the state equation. Although the test is apparently 
similar to the Dickey and Fuller (1981) test in the framework of observable autoregressive model, 
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the variable b1, t is not observable in our model. The DF test is not applicable since we do not 
know the distribution of the DF test statistic in the state space model. With this caution in mind, 
we formally use the DF test for the hypothesis testing of (4). More rigorously, we implement the 
unit root test by the methods proposed by Perron (1989,p.1380:equation (13)), because the process 
has a trend break. 
 
3. The Data and Basic Statistics 
     The data are compiled from the Nomura Research Institute Japan. The daily closing stock 
price Pt is measured in local currency. We examine the stock price indices for the nine Asian stock 
markets, consisting of the Stock Exchange of Thailand Index in Thailand, the Jakarta Composite 
Index in Indonesia, the Korea Composite Stock Price Index in Korea, the Philippine Composite 
Index in Philippine, the Hang Seng Index in Hong Kong, the Strait Times Index in Singapore, the 
Shanghai B Share Index in China, the Taiwan Stock Exchange Weighted Price Index in Taiwan, 
and the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange composite index in Malaysia.7 The sample periods are the 
same for all the markets, ranging from January 1, 1995 to December 31, 2001. The number of 
observations is approximately 2000 for each country. We choose the appropriate sample periods 
for computation before and after the IMF supported program started. 
    The stock price indices and the returns for the whole periods are illustrated in Figures 2 and 
3. Both the stock price indices and the returns exhibit large fluctuations over the periods. In 
particular, after the Asian crisis, the indices drastically drop down and the volatilities of returns 
greatly enlarge. However, it is not apparent to see from Figures 2 and 3 what the drastic changes 
of movement in the price indexes and the returns really mean.  
    First, we look carefully at the summary statistics of the data in the pre-crisis and the 
post-crisis samples. Table 2 indicate the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, 
skewness, excess kurtosis, the first order autocorrelation for the returns and the first order 
autocorrelation for the squared returns from the both sub-samples for each country. The asterisks 
in the columns 4 and 5 denote that the values are significant from zero at 5% level, meaning the 
non normal distribution of returns. The asterisks in the column 7 reject the null of no first order 
                                                     
7 The Shanghai market is much larger than the Shenzhen market in terms of market capitalization. Each 
market is separated into the A market (only domestic investors are allowed to trade) and the B market (not 
restricted to domestic investors). However, the index of the B market is measured in Hong Kong dollars or 
US dollars. We only analyze the Shanghai B market in this paper. 
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autocorrelation of the squared returns at 5% level. Table 2 reveals that the typical features of stock 
returns such as fat tail, spiked peak, and the persistence of variance are observed for the Asian 
stock markets. Therefore, the ARCH-type model incorporating the above facts is appropriate for 
analyzing the return series. The asterisks in the column 6 reject the null of no first order 
autocorrelation of the returns at 5% level. The first order autocorrelations of the returns are 
significant for the six out the nine markets. This fact indicates that more than half of the Asian 
markets are inefficient for the periods of January 1, 1995 to December 31, 2001. 
 
                   [Insert Figure 2, Figure 3 and Table 2] 
 
                  
4. Empirical Results and Discussions 
Preliminary Results 
 We compare Table 2 (a) for the pre-crisis sample with Table 2(b) for the post-crisis. 
There exist significant first order autocorrelations of the returns in most of the markets. However, 
if we look at the Table 2 (a) and (b) in detail, the values of autocorrelation for the post-crisis are 
less than those for the pre-crisis sample in all countries except for Taiwan. Since ρ(1) = 0 means 
the market efficiency, the markets for the post-crisis are generally more efficient than those for the 
pre-crisis. 
 In order to find the rough time trend of the first order autocorrelation, we calculate the 
moving autocorrelation of 2T+1 days (MARt for 2T+1) defined by  
 
    ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −−=+ ∑∑
−=−=
−
T
Ti
tit
T
Ti
tittitt rrrrrrTforMAR
2
;;1; )())(()12(  (5) 
where tr
−
 is a mean of { }T Tiitr −=+ . The MARt is an analogue to the construction of the moving 
average from the returns. Figure 4 plots the MARt for 1001,201 and 25 for each country. From 
visual examination of the MARt for 201 in Figure 4, we see that the moving autocorrelation in the 
supported countries (Thailand, Indonesia and Korea), the quasi-supported country (Philippines) 
and Singapore seem to approach to zero after the start date of the IMF program (July 2,1997). 
Among the non-supported countries, the MARt of China, Hong Kong and Taiwan seem to be 
unchanged between the pre- and post-crisis, but the MARt of Malaysia seems to rise in the 
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post-crisis period. However, from those of the MARt for 1001 and 25, we can never find the 
confirmed results. 
     Applying the before-after approach and the with-without approach to the basic statistics, 
we may preliminarily say that the IMF-supported programs have a positive effect on the 
post-crisis Asian market efficiency on the basis of an intuitively reasonable but naive method of 
the MAR. However, in order to confirm the preliminary results, we need more sound and rigorous 
analysis of the IMF supported programs.  
 
[Insert Figure 4] 
 
Main Results 
Table 3 shows the estimated parameters of the time-varying parameter model presented 
in (1), (2) and (3).8 The estimates of β0 are close to unity for most markets. However, the 
estimates of β1 are far from unity expect for the Hong Kong market but rather close to zero for the 
remained markets. If the RW type model is true in the Asian markets, the estimates of β1 are 
expected to be close to unity. We test the unit-root hypothesis of (4) for the process of {b1,t}. Table 
4 shows that the null hypothesis is rejected at 5% level for all the countries expect for the Hong 
Kong market. The stock prices in the Asian markets do not follow the RW type time varying 
parameter models. Even though the Hong Kong market is exception, the AR type theoretically 
covers the RW type.  
We have already checked for 11 <β  in Table 4. The visual examination in Figure 4 
should be confirmed by the statistical tests for (α1≥ 0 and/or γ1,1≥0 ), (α1 +γ1,1 10-3t1>0), and (γ 
1,2<0 and α1 +γ1,1 10-3t1+γ1,2 10-3 (tT-t1) ≈0 ) in the equation (2), since the non-stochastic part of b1, t 
is ( α1 +γ1,1 t*+γ 1,2 t**). See Figure 1. For example, if α1> 0 and/or γ1,1 = 0, α1 +γ1,1 10-3t1>0, and 
γ1,2< 0 and α1 +γ1,1 10-3t1+γ1,2 10-3 (tT-t1) ≈0, b1,t has no time trend before the crisis but has a 
decreasing time trend toward zero after the crisis. Table 3 presents the estimates of equations (1) 
and (2). First, in terms of the before-after approach, the IMF programs for the supported and 
quasi-supported countries have positive effects on the market efficiency after the crisis, because 
                                                     
8 As the estimates of EGARCH terms (i.e., equation (3)) are not main interest in this paper, Table 3 did not 
indicate those estimates. However, those estimates suggest that the EGARC formulation is useful to 
describe the process of stock returns for the Asian markets. In particular, most of the coefficients for 
asymmetric responses to positive and negative shocks (φ3) are significant at 5% level. The volatility 
increases after the Asian crisis for 6 countries out of 9 at 10% level.  
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the estimates of α1 and/or γ1,1 are significant positive and α1 +γ1,1 10-3t1>0 while those of γ1,2 are 
negative and significant at 5% level, and goes to zero (α1 +γ1,1 10-3t1+γ1,2 10-3 (tT-t1) ≈0) over time 
within the sample periods for all the above mentioned countries except for Thailand. Note that 
α1= γ1,1 =0 at even 10% andα1 +γ1,110-3t1+γ1,2 10-3 (tT-t1)=-0.161 for Thailand and then, the 
efficiency is perfect before the program (the crisis) and decreases after it. Second, we assess the 
IMF program in terms of the with-without approach. The five countries of Hong Kong, Singapore, 
China, Taiwan and Malaysia are non-supported countries. These countries are divided into the two 
groups according to the market behaviors after the crisis; the first group consists of China and 
Taiwan and Malaysia, the second group of Hong Kong and Singapore. All countries in the first 
group have negative estimates of γ1,1 but positive estimates of γ1,2, in particular the estimates of 
γ1,2 for Taiwan and Malaysia are significantly positive at 5% level: α1 and γ1,1 are significantly 
positive or insignificant, α1 +γ1,1 10-3t1 is negative or zero, but α1 +γ1,1 10-3t1+γ1,2 10-3 (tT-t1) is 
positive. The stock markets for these countries did not improve efficiency after the crisis in 
contrast to the IMF supported countries where the markets improved efficiency after the crisis. 
That is, as shown at the last column of Table 3, the time trend of b1,t increase roughly from 
negative to positive values across zero. This fact indicates the success of the IMF program in 
terms of the with-without approach. 
     Malaysia more strictly controlled the stock markets to prevent the speculative attacks 
during the crisis than the pre-crisis period. In fact, in 1998, Malaysia imposed a range of foreign 
exchange and capital controls that substantially insulated Malaysian financial markets from 
external influences and effectively closed down the offshore ringgit market. See IMF (1999, 
pp.180-185) in detail. 
     On the other hand, the second group (Hong Kong and Singapore) have the same pattern of 
estimated coefficients as that of the IMF supported countries. Namely, Singapore in the second 
group has insignificantly positive estimates of γ1,1, and has significantly negative estimates of γ1,2 
together with positive estimate of α1 at 5% level. That is, it has a decreasing time trend toward 
zero after the crisis and goes to zero over time within the sample periods as shown in the last 
column of Table 3. On the other hand, the Hong Kong market is always efficient. This observation 
does not provide the evidence confirming the IMF program if we use Hong Kong and Singapore 
as the without countries. However, we note that this observation does not necessary mean failure 
of the IMF programs implemented into Indonesia, Korea and Pphilippines, because other policy 
measures taken by Hong Kong and Singapore might have improved the market efficiency. In fact, 
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many structural reforms in Hong Kong and Singapore are executed toward market deregulation 
after the crisis, following their own programs. For example, despite of equity market intervention 
just after the crisis, Hong Kong Monetary Authority and the Securities and Futures Commission 
lead to upgrade the market transparency and protection of investors with restrictions in 1998. See 
IMF (1999, pp.170-180) in detail. It may be an interesting question to examine why the smoothing 
estimates of Hong Kong and Singapore are going toward that of the efficient markets after the 
crisis. But we need further studies to answer this question. 
 
                     [Insert Table 3 and Table 4] 
 
 
5. Event Study Approach 
 We define the abnormal return abrj  
 
 }{ 100100, + −=+−= iijjjjj rofmeanaisrwhererrabr  , (6)  
 
where the j is the date of announcement of IMF-supported program. The jr is the moving average 
from the returns, based on 201 days which is used for the analysis for MARt and yields good 
suggestions. If abrj>0 or abrj+1>0, we can preliminarily say that the program’s announcement 
ameliorate the systemic risk. We consider the one day lag of program’s announcement effect 
because of psychological and physical delay. Table 5 shows that the announcements (of the 
program shown in Table 1) in Indonesia and Korea indicate the significant positive abnormal 
returns at the next date of some announcements, while no significant positive abnormal returns 
appear in Thailand. In general, the effects of the long-run policy like structural reform naturally 
appears its effects in a long run, and then its announcement’s effects based on a short-run view is 
difficult to be strongly positive. However, Lau and McInish (2003) have studied the 
announcements of the IMF macroeconomic policy with the short-run effects, providing positive 
assessment in all supported countries. 
 
[Insert Table 5] 
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 In order to confirm the preliminary results, we implement the test by using the dummy 
variables for the dates of program announcements or the next dates. That is, we test whether the 
coefficients of dummy variables for announcement dates are positive significant in the following 
AR(1) equation:  
 
     )(0,~:)(rbar 2tt1 ,,1-tt σεεδγ NEDkj tjjtjj ++++= ∑ =      (7) 
 
where j is a suffix from the first to k-th announcement date. The Dj,t is a dummy variable for 
announcement j, equal to 1 for day t when announcement j occurs and zero otherwise. The Ej,t is 
also a dummy variable for announcement j, equal to 1 for next date t+1 to date t when 
announcement j occurs and zero otherwise. As seen at Tables 1 and 5, the two, four, and three 
events (announcements of IMF programs) occur in Thailand, Indonesia and Korea, respectively. 
Table 6 indicates that the Korean market shows that announcement effect is significant positive on 
the day for the first event, and on the next day for the second event. In the Indonesia market, the 
significant positive effect appears on the day for the second event. There is a significant effect on 
the next day for the third event in Thailand.  
 
[Insert Table 6] 
 
These results confirm the preliminary results. Why did the Korean market show the positive 
abnormal returns replying to the announcement for the long-run policy? Yoo and Moon(1999) 
concluded that the Korean economy still possesses strong fundamentals, but poor microeconomic 
policies with regard to the financial sector have disastrous consequence, therefore, the economic 
recovery is obtained with continuous reform efforts to a safe and sound financial sector. Based on 
their conclusion, it is imagined that the Korean investors expected positively the structural reform 
policy by the IMF programs, and then the positive abnormal returns appear replying to even the 
announcement of long-run policies. However, further researches are necessary.  
 
 
6. Conclusions  
 We assessed the IMF supported program for the structural reforms against the Asian crisis 
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by using three evaluation methodologies of the before-after approach (which compares the 
performance in a country between the pre- and post-programs), the with-without approach (which 
compares the performance in different countries with supported program and without supported 
program) and the event study approach for program’s announcements (which investigates whether 
the announcement produces the positive excess return). We employed a time varying parameter 
model for analyzing the nine Asian stock markets. Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea took the 
IMF-supported program after the crisis, Philippines took the program before the crisis, but Hong 
Kong, Singapore, China, Taiwan and Malaysia did not take the program.   
 We assessed the IMF-supported program successful in terms of the before-after approach. 
That is to say, all the IMF-supported countries except for Thailand remarkably improved 
efficiency in the stock markets after the implementation of the program on July 2, 1997. This 
result is confirmed by the analysis of the time varying parameter model in addition to the 
preliminary analysis of moving autocorrelations.  
 In terms of the with-without approach, the IMF program is effective if we choose China, 
Taiwan and Malaysia as the without-supported countries. The market efficiency in these 
non-supported countries does not improve after the program implementation. On the other hand, if 
Hong Kong and Singapore are chosen as the without-supported countries, the with-without 
approach does not provide the evidence for success of the IMF programs, because this country 
improved efficiency after the crisis broke out. However, thinking in mind that the improvement of 
market efficiency in Hong Kong and Singapore can be attributed to their own structural reform 
programs, we positively evaluate that the IMF program to improve market efficiency is successful 
in terms of the with-without approach as a whole except for Thailand. 
 Also, we assess whether the program announcements help ameliorate systemic risk. This 
approach was not classified yet by Khan (1990) but a new approach used recently by Kho and 
Stulz (2000) and Lau and McInish (2003). All the IMF supported countries show the positive 
abnormal returns replying to the announcements of the IMF-supported program. In general, the 
announcement’s effects based on a short-run view are not strongly positive for the long-run policy 
like structural reform. Why did the market show the positive abnormal returns? Following Yoo 
and Moon(1999), the Korean investors already expected positively the structural reform policy by 
the IMF programs. Then, we can suppose that the positive abnormal returns appear replying to 
even the announcement of long-run policies.  
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Table 1. Chronological Highlight for IMF Supported Program  
on Structural Reform 
 
Thailand 
August 20,1997: structural initiatives to increase efficiency, deepen the role of the private sector in 
the Thai economy, and reinforce its outward orientation, civil service reform, privatization, and 
initiatives to attract foreign capital. 
February 24, 1998 and May 26, 1998:  Improving governance in both the corporate and 
government sector. Further deepening the role of the private sector, including through initiatives 
to attract foreign capital. 
Indonesia 
November 5,1997: Structural reforms to enhance economic efficiency and transparency,  
including liberalization of foreign trade and investment, dismantling of domestic monopolies, and 
expanding the privatization program. 
January 15,1998: Limiting the monopoly of the national marketing board to rice, deregulating 
domestic trade in agricultural produce, and eliminating restrictive market arrangements. 
April 10, 1998: An extensive agenda of structural reforms to increase competition and efficiency 
in the economy, reinforcing the commitments made in January and including the further 
privatization of six major state enterprises already listed and the identification of seven new 
enterprises for privatization in 1998/1999. 
June 24, 1998: Establishing an effective bankruptcy system, as an essential part of the corporate 
debt-restructuring strategy envisaged by the June 4 agreement between the government and 
creditor banks on debt restructuring. 
Korea 
December 4,1997: efforts to dismantle the nontransparent and inefficient ties among the 
government, banks, and businesses, including measures to upgrade accounting, auditing, and 
disclosure standards, to require that corporate financial statements be prepared on a consolidated 
basis and certified by external auditors, and to phase out the system of cross guarantees within 
conglomerates. 
December 24,1997: speeding up the liberalization of capital and money markets, including the 
lifting of all capital account restrictions on foreign investors’ access to the Korean bond market by 
December 31, 1997. 
February 7,1998: introducing a number of measures to improve corporate transparency, including 
strengthening the oversight functions of corporate boards of directors, increasing accountability to 
shareholders, and introducing outside directors and external audit committees. 
 
Note: This table is made from Annual Report 1998, p.23-32, IMF.  
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Table 2. Summary statistics of the daily returns 
(a) Pre-crisis sample 
Pre Sample NOBS MEAN STD SKEW KURT ρ??? ρ???? 
Thailand 610 -0.155 1.440 0.049 1.698* 0.157* 0.113*
Indonesia 614 0.072 0.919 0.154 3.610* 0.262* 0.182*
Korea 731 -0.040 1.121 0.292* 0.962* 0.174* 0.075*
Philippines 619 0.001 1.152 -0.176 2.455* 0.222* 0.094*
Hong Kong 617 0.107 1.169 -0.288* 4.163* 0.046 0.046 
Singapore 621 0.006 0.880 -0.282* 2.972* 0.192* 0.176*
China 612 0.112 2.861 0.965* 18.363* 0.048 0.154*
Taiwan 714 0.035 1.270 -0.396* 2.766* -0.016 0.028 
Malaysia 611 0.017 1.028 0.265* 3.055* 0.151* 0.222*
(b) Post-crisis sample 
Post Sample NOBS MEAN STD SKEW KURT ρ??? ρ???? 
Thailand 1107 -0.052 2.285 0.634* 2.769* 0.141* 0.265*
Indonesia 1105 -0.060 2.264 0.308* 4.745* 0.183* 0.154*
Korea 1174 -0.034 2.755 -0.060 0.710* 0.104* 0.090*
Philippines 1122 -0.096 1.944 1.011* 10.382* 0.175* 0.091*
Hong Kong 1107 -0.026 2.273 0.189* 6.794* 0.015 0.365*
Singapore 1132 -0.030 1.852 0.378* 7.231* 0.138* 0.176*
China 1093 0.025 1.566 0.076 6.178* -0.006 0.250*
Taiwan 1198 -0.050 1.783 0.016 1.228* 0.077* 0.155*
Malaysia 1108 -0.046 2.435 0.507* 21.855* 0.042 0.491*
 
Notes: "NOBS", "STDEV", " KURT", "ρ(1)", and "ρ2(1)" respectively denote the number of the observations, 
standard deviation, excess kurtosis, the first order autocorrelation of the return process, and the first order 
autocorrelation of the squared return process. The asterisks "?"????????????statistical significance at the 0.05 
level. 
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Table 3. Estimation results 
Parameters for Equ. (1) and (2) 
Supported countries 
? ? α? β? ??? α? β? ??? γ??  γ??  α?+ γ?? t?10-3 
α?+γ?? t?10-3 
+γ?? (t?-t?)10-3 
Thailand -0.048  0.565  0.556  -0.044  -0.082 0.304 0.361 -0.306** 0.177? -0.161?
?  (0.025) (0.067) (0.222) (0.141) (0.203) (0.076) (0.251) (0.124) ? ?
Indonesia -0.001  0.933  0.087  0.262** -0.017 0.559 0.083 -0.215* 0.313? 0.076?
?  (0.001) (0.029) (0.032) (0.104) (0.073) (0.071) (0.244) (0.111)   
Korea -0.023  0.226  0.451  0.057** 0.040 0.000 0.177** -0.162**  0.187? -0.003?
?  (0.014) (0.031) (0.076) (0.011) (0.077) (0.000) (0.015) (0.045)   
Philippines -0.040  0.425  0.462  0.133** -0.436 0.276 0.306** -0.289**  0.323? -0.001?
?  (0.026) (0.070) (0.097) (0.025) (0.067) (0.051) (0.033) (0.112)   
Non-supported countries 
? ? α? β? ??? α? β? ??? γ??  γ??  α?+ γ?? t?10-3 
α?+γ?? t?10-3 
+γ?? (t?-t?)10-3 
Hong 
Kong -0.001  0.969  0.069  0.011  0.881 0.000 0.001 -0.008  0.012? 0.003?
?  (0.002) (0.018) (0.023) (0.011) (0.079) (0.000) (0.018) (0.011)   
Singapore -0.002  0.959  0.037  0.248* -0.319 0.177 0.170 -0.357**  0.354? -0.050?
?  (0.002) (0.024) (0.014) (0.129) (0.269) (0.085) (0.244) (0.142)   
China 0.002  0.920  0.000  0.243** -0.176 0.363 -0.509** 0.162**  -0.070? 0.107?
(Shanghi 
A) (0.003) (0.041) (0.000) (0.046) (0.136) (0.132) (0.074) (0.067)   
Taiwan -0.021  0.600  0.514  -0.095  0.027 0.001 -0.009 0.138**  -0.101? 0.064?
?  (0.008) (0.049) (0.056) (0.079) (0.234) (0.001) (0.101) (0.039)   
Malaysia -0.001  0.956  0.057  0.189* -0.175 0.333 -0.164 0.261**  0.088? 0.377?
?  (0.002) (0.029) (0.043) (0.111) (0.061) (0.078) (0.143) (0.062)   
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis. The estimates of α1, γ1 and γ2 with "**" indicate 
significance at 5% level and with "*" indicate significance at 10% level 
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Table 4. DF test for β1 = 1.0 
Thailand 
 
Indonesia Korea 
 
Philippines Hong Kong Singapore China Taiwan Malaysia
-5.33 -13.93 -12.47 -21.43 -1.51 -4.90 -8.65 -4.16 -19.26 
Note: The entries denote the values of the unit root test statistic " βσβ ˆ/)1( 1 −
∧
" where βσˆ  is a 
standard error for 1β
∧
 and denoted in the parenthesis below the estimates in Table 3. The order 
of the lags is zero (i.e. it is not an augumented test) for the sake of simplicity. The 5% significance point of 
the t statistic for β1=1 is –3.96 from Table V.B of Perron (1989, p. 1377), in view of the fact that 
180/332≈0.5. 
 
Table 5.  Program’s Announcements and Abnormal returns 
Abnormal returns Abnormal returns Dates of Announcements 
(at announcement date) (at next date) 
Thailand ?  ?  
8/20/1997  γ1 -0.364 -0.249 
2/24/1998  γ2 -0.555 -0.432 
5/26/1998  γ3 -1.139 -4.075 
Indonesia ?  ?  
11/5/1997  γ1 -0.637 -2.349 
1/15/1998  γ2 -4.035  6.843* 
4/10/1998  γ3             + -0.508 
6/24/1998  γ4 1.953 -0.382 
Korea ?  ?  
12/4/1997   γ1  6.951*  6.939* 
12/24/1997  γ2 -3.876  6.825* 
2/7/1998    γ3 0.736 2.445 
Notes: +; The market was closed on the day when the announcement was released: the ‘next 
date’ is the first trading date after that day.  
*; A simple one-sided t-test, t = abrj / s, indicates significance at 5% level, where s denotes the 
sample standard deviation from the full samples. The estimate of s for each market is shown 
in Table 2(a). The t-statistic is assumed to be distributed as N (0,1) under the null hypothesis 
of no announcement effect.  
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Table 6. Estimated Coefficients of Dummy Variables for Announcement’s Date 
Estimated Coefficients Countries 
γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 
Thailand ?  ?  ?  ?  
The date? ? γ ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ? ?
?  ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ? ?
The next date? δ ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ? ?
?  ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ? ?
Indonesia ?  ?  ?  ?  
The date? ? γ ??? ??? ??? ??? ? ? ?? ??? ?
?  ??? ??? ??? ??? ? ? ??? ????
The next date? δ ??? ??? ?? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ?
?  ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ????
Korea ?  ?  ?  ?  
The date? ? γ ?? ??? ??? ??? ?? ??? ? ?
?  ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ? ?
The next date? δ ?? ??? ?? ??? ?? ??? ? ?
?  ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ? ?
Notes: The standard errors are in the parentheses. The asterisk "*" indicates 
significance at 10% level.  
 
 
Figure 1. Time Trend Structure 
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Figure 2.  Stock price indices 
(a) Supported countries 
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(b) Non-supported countries 
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Figure 3. Returns on the Stock price indices 
(a) Supported countries 
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Figure 3. Moving autocorrelations for 1001, 201 and 25 days 
(a) Supported countries 
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(b) Non-supported countries 
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